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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of asymmetric 
information on the purchase of high-value infrequently 
traded assets. If a high-value asset is infrequently traded 
in a market its valuation becomes less predictable and 
more tension can exist between the vendor and the 
purchaser. Often the vendor possesses more knowledge 
of the asset, which leads to an asymmetric information 
paradigm between the two parties, nurturing a dark side 
of information and knowledge management. Using the 
New Zealand real estate industry as the context of a 
design science research study, a purchase decision 
process model for high-value infrequently traded assets 
has been developed. It aims to support the novice real 
estate purchaser to realise the potential pitfalls they 
should avoid. The study also calls for a unified system 
with codifiable, explicit information that can be used by 
all stakeholders in high-value infrequently transactions. 
Thus reducing the asymmetric information imbalance 
between vendor and purchaser.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Trading goods is  part of human existence and has 
always created tension between vendor and purchaser. 
This tension is particularly apparent in high-value assets 
with information that is hard to ascertain. The misuse of 
asymmetric information has been the cornerstone for 
many a charlatan and has allowed snake oil to be 
pedalled throughout history.  
A purchaser that infrequently purchases a high-value 
asset through an intermediary is at a particular 
disadvantage. They face an increased risk of forming a 
purchase decision based on information that can’t be 
relied on to adjust their assumptions or actions [5]. The 
infrequency of trading and asymmetric information 
disproportionately advantages the vendor (or 
intermediary) in the sale of a high-value asset with 
specialised proprietary knowledge. 
Furthermore, the vendor can also take advantage of 
the noise in the communication channel [19]. When 
purchase decisions are affected by such noise and are 
not verifiable, it can lead to a long-lasting financial 
impact and could be hard to revert a purchase legally. 
Most governments have laws in place to prevent blatant 
misuse of asymmetric information in trading. For 
example, the United States has a "Lemon Law" 
(Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 1975) that protects the 
purchaser from defective goods and enforcing implied 
warranties. New Zealand has the Fair Trading Act 
(1986) to protect consumers. However, it is in the 
margins of the law, which are hard to prove, where 
much financial hardship could occur. Besides, there are 
further problems with acquiring the necessary 
information, such as their codifiability,  
comprehensibility, reliability, and relevancy [15]. To 
resolve these issues, it naturally calls for a knowledge 
base filled with well-defined, historically complete, 
trustworthy and meaningful, timestamped records 
representing each of the high-value infrequently traded 
assets. 
Over the past 150 years, dating back to the industrial 
revolution, we have used a linear economic model 
where goods are manufactured from raw materials and 
sold, used and thrown away. In the last 15 years there is 
a groundswell for moving to a circular economy where 
the added value of products is held for as long as 
possible to reduce waste. Such a concept re-imagines 
how the material flows through the economy might be 
closed [18]. This should apply to data as well; critical 
information associated with a high-value infrequently 
traded asset is not just gathered for one time and 
discarded, instead it remains in the knowledge base for 
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 as long as possible ensuring the proverbial wheel is not 
reinvented many times. 
In this paper, we first delve into understanding 
information asymmetry and knowledge. We then look at 
information asymmetry of high-value infrequently 
traded assets in the context of the real estate industry. 
We conduct our study using New Zealand as an 
exemplar. We develop practical models that could be 
generalised to other industries to reduce information 
asymmetry between vendor and purchaser. Finally, we 
discuss how a purchaser could benefit from these 
models.   
 
2. Information Asymmetry and Knowledge 
 
Problems relating to information asymmetry going 
back to the eighteenth century have been discussed. 
According to Stiglitz [20] information is not perfect,  
obtaining information is costly, and there is always a 
degree of information asymmetry among competitive 
markets. The extent of this  is associated with actions of 
individuals and organisations. Information asymmetry 
in a competitive market gives an advantage to one party 
while  disadvantaging the other. 
The literature is clear on the negative outcomes 
associated with asymmetric information particularly for 
the  purchaser. However, there is little known about the 
role of asymmetric information in transactions of high-
value low-frequency assets, and how it could affect the 
purchaser decision process. This is the gap in the 
literature that we plan to ameliorate.  
The study of information and knowledge covers a 
vast domain of literature as it applies to a large number 
of academic disciplines. The basic definition of 
knowledge often used among epistemologists is that of 
Plato, describing a proposition that knowledge is present 
when truth intersects with belief and becomes a justified 
belief. Ackoff [1] argues that the primary goal of 
gaining knowledge is to progress towards wisdom. 
Knowledge is obtained by formalising facts and ideas, 
processing them into information, and converting them 
to knowledge [8]. Tuomi [21] describes  
contextualisation as a driving force to understand the 
data to knowledge transformation. Along the same lines, 
Carpenter and Cannady [7] add environment as a 
prerequisite to data, and vision as an outcome of 
wisdom. Most conceptual models of knowledge are 
linear; perhaps a circular model would be more 
appropriate, especially if understanding and context are 
continuously changing and affecting each other as is the 
case of high-value infrequent traded assets. There is also 
a lack of practicality and measurability [12] among 
those conceptual models for our purpose. 
Furthermore, knowledge is either tacit or explicit 
[3]. Nonaka and Takeuchi [17] define tacit knowledge 
as "personal knowledge embedded in individual 
experience and involves intangible factors such as 
personal beliefs, perspective and value systems," and 
explicit knowledge could be expressed in code and is not 
subject to multiple interpretations. Tacit knowledge is 
either "has not" been formalised or "could not be” 
formalised.  Once knowledge is formalised, it becomes 
explicit [13]. In the context of purchasing high-value 
infrequently traded assets, the information asymmetry 
could appear within the realm of tacit knowledge. The 
unverifiable statements made to a purchaser, for 
instance, are hard to verify and even harder to rectify 
after a purchase. This  leads us to the question of 
whether we could reduce the amount of tacit knowledge 
and increase the amount of explicit knowledge, held on 
a property for instance, and how it could be managed 
and shared. 
Knowledge management systems often focus on the 
sharing of information within an organisation. 
According to Brooking [6], knowledge management is 
the process by which we manage human-centred assets. 
The function of knowledge management is to guard and 
grow knowledge owned by individuals and, where 
possible, transfer the asset into a form where others can 
more readily share it. But the difficulty faced by 
knowledge management systems is to codify tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge [9]. 
If knowledge exists ultimately within individuals, 
and individuals are participating simultaneously in 
multiple group processes to make and execute critical 
decisions, then a fundamental of "managing knowledge" 
must be to build some degree of shared context [10]. 
Alavi and Leidner [3] study the objective of knowledge 
management systems to support the creation, transfer, 
and application of knowledge. After creating a shared 
context, translating tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge, and building a reliable knowledge 
management system, there will be a need for presenting 
the information in a uniform way that can be understood 
by a large segment of the population relying on them to 
make educated decisions.  
Selling and buying high-value infrequently traded 
assets involving multi-stakeholders is seen as a finite, 
zero-sum game. Within this context, we focus on the 
New Zealand real estate industry as a domain with 
conflicting objectives among vendors, intermediaries 
and purchasers. And we highlight the processes that 
involve counterbalancing information asymmetry on 
these high-value low-frequency transactions. While the 
focus is on the New Zealand real estate industry, these 
issues arise in many high-value low-frequency asset 
transactions in various domains throughout the world. 
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 3. The Study  
 
We scope our investigation to the New Zealand real 
estate industry as it has several unique features. For 
instance, nearly a third of New Zealanders use real 
estate as one of their primary, long-term, investment 
strategies. To compound matters, a purchaser of real 
estate in New Zealand does not have a dedicated agent 
to work on their behalf, rather they depend on the 
vendor's agent to assist with the transaction. 
In our study, we purposefully focused on the novice 
residential real estate purchaser and how, potentially, 
they could be disadvantaged from making purchase 
decision with information asymmetry in high-value 
infrequently traded transactions. We identified six  types 
of stakeholders in the real estate industry and used an 
interpretive lens as our philosophical assumption. 
Initially, we conducted semi-structured interviews to 
collect empirical data on how experienced real estate 
agents would buy a property for themselves. We also 
interviewed four experienced developers to gain an 
understanding of how decisions were made for buying 
land or property. This empirical data was used to create 
a Model of Communication and a Purchaser Decision 
Process Model to support a novice purchaser buying real 
estate. These artefacts were then assessed and analysed 
using a focus group, resulting in a further refined Model 
of Communication (Figure 1) and the Purchaser 
Decision Process Model (Figure 2).  Next, two rounds 
of semi-structured interviews were conducted with two 
employees of a real estate agency in New Zealand, both 
having over 20 years of experience. One of the 
interviewees had sold over 400 residential properties 
while the other was a licensed real estate agent who 
handled the administrative processes of finalising 
transactions. The initial interviews covered the entire 
process of purchasing real estate in New Zealand. 
Subsequently, we divided this process into six stages 
and it is introduced in a later section. The primary aim 
of the interviews was to identify all the stakeholders 
involved in each stage of the real estate purchasing 
process and the questions that needed to be addressed by 
a purchaser at each stage. The second round of 
interviews was held with the same interviewees aiming 
to classify all the questions into hard and soft criteria. 
The criteria were explained to the candidates as 
measurable (tacit) or non-measurable answers (explicit). 
The hard and soft criteria were then synthesised into the 
two models (Model of Communication and the 
Purchaser Decision Process Model) as tacit and explicit 
information. With regard to the Purchaser Decision 
Process Model (Figure 2), we translated the findings and 
developed a roadmap to purchasing real estate in New 
Zealand (Figure 3). These artefacts, namely the model 
and roadmap, were then further refined and validated by 
a focus group that met twice. The focus group consisted 
of six members with diverse backgrounds ranging from 
novice to experienced investors aged between 24 to 52.  
These members also had a mixture of cultural 
backgrounds and experiences of real estate purchases 
outside of New Zealand.  
The semi-structured interviews with the domain 
experts and the considerations from the series of focus 
groups resulted in a model of communication and a 
decision process roadmap that could be practically 
implemented to support novice real estate purchasers to 
ask the right questions when purchasing real estate.  
 
4. Research Artefacts  
 
In New Zealand, there are multiple stakeholders 
involved in collecting information about a real estate 
property. There are also conflicting objectives among 
the government, council, specialist, and real estate 
organisation. There is a discrepancy between property 
files held by the council and the Land Information 
Memorandum (LIM). A purchaser would typically hire 
specialists such as a building expert, engineer, surveyor 
and others during the due diligence period. They collect 
enormous amounts of data related to a property without 
any obligation to register this information. If the sale 
does not result in an unconditional offer, the information 
collected will be lost. Multiple specialists with different 
outcomes can sometimes perform these information 
collection exercise multiple times for the same property.  
There is also much-biased information given on a 
verbal basis, often through real estate agents. An 
example could be "the house has just been painted." The 
information could be more value-added to a purchaser if 
the company name is mentioned, the date it happened, 
the warranty on the kind of paint that was used and the 
cost of the paint job. Interestingly, the majority of 
information about a property is often given verbally by 
a real estate agent. Furthermore, there is a possibility of 
adding an "owners" database to a property file that could 
be linked to the LIM and therefore become part of the 
property file itself.  
It has also been established by Allmon and Grant [4] 
that as the principal intermediary, the real estate agent, 
does not always have the best interest in mind for both 
the purchaser and the vendor. The primary driver for a 
real estate agent is the actual property sale. Their key 
performance indicators (KPI) are number of listings, 
number of potential purchasers, and sales volume. 
Hence, they do not always align with the best interests 
of purchasers. 
Purchasing and selling real estate in New Zealand is 
becoming more complex. New rules and regulations are 
introduced and more and more of the responsibilities are 
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 delegated to the real estate agent and the purchaser. 
Once the initial price negotiation is completed there is 
often a deadline to finish the due diligence of the sale by 
the purchaser. 
The real estate industry can be identified by multiple 
stakeholders with conflicting objectives in a finite, zero-
sum game typically involving many intermediaries to 
obtain a satisfactory transaction between a vendor and a 
purchaser. For a purchaser, there is the added 
complexity of finding all the right documents needed to 
make an informed decision on a real estate transaction 
and conduct proper due diligence. Currently, there is a 
property file that can be requested from the council with 
all the consent notices, forms, code of compliances and 
reports they have on file for a particular property. This 
is summarised in a LIM and can be purchased for 
approximately NZD$200 to NZD$400 and gives 
consents, legal description, lands use, zoning, utilities. 
The property file and LIM do not always correlate and 
sometimes have critical information missing. 
The information presented in a LIM has a legal 
caveat that the council is not liable and cannot guarantee 
the accuracy of the information. Furthermore, the LIM 
is not printed with any page numbers leaving it 
susceptible to manipulation. A purchaser then needs to 
obtain a title that gives caveats, covenants, mortgages, 
etc., lodged against the title. There are multitudes of 
reports that can be requested. Moisture report, asbestos 
report, electrician report, builders report, soil test, 
archaeological test, drainage report, geo-tech report, 
valuation report, etc. These reports are paid for by a 
purchaser and are not reported back to the council. This 
can result in the same report being requested multiple 
times and sometimes overlooked completely. In buying 
a property, there is a lot of smaller indicators that could 
assist a sale of real estate. These are often verbally 
transmitted and after a sale is completed, possibly lost. 
There is a crucial link of information missing in land and 
real estate transactions, and that is private information 
known to the vendor and not necessarily legally required 
to submit. This information could paint a full picture of 
the property being sold. This information is diverse and 
could range from the date a new hot-water cylinder was 
installed, a recent repaint of a house, the paint used, the 
new locks and alarm system, solar systems, etc. This 
information would have a date, installers name, price, 
and possible warranty. This would also ensure that 
warranties are transferable to the new owner. This 
information would also improve the code of conduct for 
a large number of trades as a warranty, and their name 
is now attached to the property. Figure 1 illustrates the 
information asymmetry between a purchaser and vendor 
of a real estate transaction by adapting Shannon and 
Weaver model of communication [19]. 
 
Figure 1. Model of communication for a real estate transaction
 Tacit and Explicit Information Flow
Sender Encoder Channel Decoder Reciever
Seller BuyerAgent Lawyer
LawyerLawyer
Noise
Government
Tacit Knowledge
Specialists
Explicit
Explicit check
Tacit knowledge
Fig 1: Adaptation of Shannon and Weaver's (1949) Model of Communication 
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 Akerlof’s seminal paper [2] states that information 
asymmetry is prevalent in second-hand markets. The 
vendor who has owned or used their asset for a while are 
better informed about the state of their asset than the 
purchaser. Since a purchaser usually cannot observe an 
asset's real quality, an unscrupulous vendor could be 
incentivised to sell at an overinflated price. 
We have divided the process of purchasing real 
estate into six specific stages. We designed the process 
stages using two steps. The first step adopts the 
hypothetical model created by Grum and Kobal Grum 
[11] that related to the psychological factors involved in 
the decision-making to buy real estate. The second step 
involves synthesising the words used in the semi-
structured interviews. 
 
Figure 2. The purchaser decision process  
These six stages are not siloed, and in some situation  
they could have overlaps. For example, dreaming and 
researching for potential properties and locations are not 
clearly defined and can easily transfer between the two 
categories, but overall it establishes the thought process 
of seasoned professionals in real estate. 
 
4.1 Dream 
 
At this stage, a purchaser is deciding where to buy. 
From the perspective of a purchaser, the stakeholders 
involved are local residents and real estate agents. We 
refer to this as the dream stage. Getting an idea of area, 
township, whether there is employment, the type of 
neighbourhood, and a rough price indication. Generally, 
a feel for the area is based on a subset of emotions. In 
general key aspects/issues of importance are: local area, 
feel, medical centre, township activity, transportation, 
community offering, shop, cafe, school, neighbourhood, 
and employment. 
 
4.2 Research 
 
This stage involves a more focused approach. A 
purchaser will find out their exact price range, dictated 
by financial institutions and their own financial sense.  
A real estate agent will provide specific information on 
why buying in the area is beneficial. 
By now, a purchaser will be narrowing down to a 
specific property and discovering growth, employment, 
infrastructure and opportunities in the area like health 
care facilities, school zoning, and internet connectivity. 
Once a potential choice is narrowed down more detailed 
information is required, including section size, 
government valuation, rates, development in the 
immediate vicinity, current market analysis, storm water 
and sewage. As one progresses on the research journey 
it becomes clear that most of the information that is 
required to take an informed decision is tacit rather than 
explicit (Table 1). This represents the dark side of many 
high-value low-frequency asset purchases which are 
made with insufficient verifiable knowledge. 
 
4.3 Offer 
 
The initial offer is drafted by the real estate agent and 
will nearly always have a few conditions in them. The 
most common are LIM, finance, and builders report. 
There are a host of other conditions that can be drawn 
up depending on the specific circumstances. There will 
also be a date set for the offer to go unconditional. At 
this stage, the vendor’s and purchaser’s lawyers are 
involved. The offer will have a final date set, and this 
will give the time to resolve all conditions set in the 
offer. An agreed deposit will be made into a trust 
account. The basic issues/requirements that need to be 
addressed before one can make an offer are: negotiate 
price and have finance organised, requesting the official 
title, fulfilling the anti-money laundering (AML) 
requirement, adding personal conditions to the sale, 
setting the due diligence period and pay the negotiated 
deposit. The dark side in this stage is the uncertainty of 
the verifiability of the information given.  
 
Table 1. Tacit vs explicit knowledge in the 
research phase 
Tacit Explicit 
View 
Growth 
Opportunity 
Future Development 
Infrastructure 
Limitation 
Lifestyle  
Price Range 
Zoning 
School District 
Healthcare 
Restriction 
Storm Water 
Internet Coverage 
Rates 
CMA 
Government Valuation 
Sewage/Septic 
Size 
 
4.4 Due Diligence 
 
This is the most important stage in a high-value low-
frequency transaction. This is where we need 
counterbalance asymmetric information so that we can 
uncover and address possible risks in the transaction.  
Dream    Research Offer
Due
Diligence
Negotiate
Un
Conditional
Purchaser Decision Process
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 This last stage in gathering all the relevant information 
pertaining to a property could be a costly and time-
consuming exercise, depending on the number of 
reports needed or requested. At this stage, all the 
stakeholders are involved. To organise finance, legal 
descriptions on a title, specific questions on chattels and 
specialists reports on the property. If the transaction 
does not proceed for any reason, the information 
collected from these reports will be lost, due to the fact 
that the potential purchaser has paid for and owns them. 
This gives the vendor the possibility to re-list the 
property with the same issues as before without needing 
to disclose or mitigate any problems identified by those 
reports. The most common reports requested in the due 
diligence stage are listed in Table 2. These reports often 
verify the tacit information and transform them into 
explicit information.  
 
4.5 Negotiate 
 
Depending on the results of the Due Diligence stage, 
there are only three remaining options. Walk away from 
the deal, renegotiate, or sign the deal. Once signed the 
offer becomes unconditional.  
 
4.6 Unconditional 
 
At this stage the transaction is finalized. The deposit  
is transferred into a trust account, and the title and 
deposit redistributed (minus lawyer, real estate fees, and 
rates expenses). The electricity, water, gas, phone, keys, 
and chattels are transferred into the new owner’s name. 
Finally, the sale price is recorded with the council. 
 
Table 2. Reports requested during Due-
diligence phase 
LIM Report 
Builders Report 
Title Requisition 
Geo-Tech Report 
Surveying 
Valuation 
Moisture Report 
Electrical Report 
Soil Testing 
Valuation Report 
Archaeological Report 
Asbestos Report 
Swimming Pool Report 
Methamphetamine 
Drainage Report 
Landscape Report 
221 Report Council 
Insulation Report 
 
5. Findings 
 
The challenges faced by a purchaser is that explicit 
information is often specialised propriety information 
and derived from a multiplicity of sources with 
conflicting objectives. Tacit information is often 
verbally transmitted by the vendor or agent.  Due to the 
low frequency in purchases, tacit knowledge is used to 
increase the asymmetric knowledge gap between a 
novice purchaser and experienced agent. The study has 
contributed to the literature in two ways. First, it has 
created a framework to guide novice purchasers of real 
estate in New Zealand. Second, the study contributes by 
adding a layer of coding ability that could be further 
developed by the real estate industry. The synthesised 
Purchaser Decision Process Roadmap (Figure 3) could 
benefit a purchaser by guiding him/her in the kind of 
questions that need to be asked when purchasing real 
estate in New Zealand. The further sub-categorising of 
the questions into tacit and explicit would give the 
possibility of partly standardising information and 
implementing knowledge management systems into the 
sales process. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our model built for real estate in New Zealand could 
potentially be generalised for real estate in other places, 
or even other high-value infrequently traded assets, such 
as the purchase of a diamond engagement ring. 
Typically, purchasing a diamond engagement ring is a 
low-frequency purchase and the information that needs 
to be gleaned before making an informed decision is 
information regarding: the diamond’s clarity, cut, and 
carat, the country of origin, the designer of the ring, the 
price, new or second-hand, fashion, etc. There is a large 
discrepancy between the knowledge of a jeweller and 
the knowledge of a novice purchaser, each with 
conflicting objectives. If we could codify and categorise 
the information, this would lead to a better informed 
purchaser and a reduced likelihood of paying a premium 
for example, due to their lack of knowledge. Although 
there are similarities between purchasing a diamond ring 
and a property, the long term financial impact is much 
greater in the latter.  
High-value infrequently traded assets are often 
purchased through an intermediary and sometimes 
checked by a third party. There is a disincentive for the 
vendor, or the agent, to codify information as it is 
currently not beneficially to the transaction. In other 
words, the vendor and/or agent benefits from the 
asymmetric information and can leverage it to 
potentially sell at a higher price. Due to the infrequency 
of trading, it is time-consuming and costly for a  
purchaser to gain the level of knowledge required to 
make an informed decision. Most of the stakeholders in 
the transaction are highly organised: lawyers, real estate 
agencies, financial institutions, councils and specialised 
advisors (surveyors, geo-tech, etc.) and nearly all have 
caveats releasing them on any inaccuracy of the 
information provided. Unlike a purchaser who has little 
legal recall if they purchased a "proverbial lemon."  The 
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 application of blockchain could be a potential solution 
to store verifiable information onto a permissioned 
distributed ledger with a shared database. This would 
address information asymmetry in various ways. First, 
all information would be timestamped giving the data a 
historical context. Second, the information would be 
verifiable and only entered through trusted nodes. Third, 
it would give a legal recall to a purchaser if the 
information used to make a purchase decision was 
wrong. And, finally, information that previously had 
been collected does not have to be reiterated saving time 
and money.  
 
Figure 3. The purchaser decision process roadmap
7. Limitations 
 
This study is limited in several ways. It could be 
argued that the number of interviews held to reach a 
conclusion are less than ideal. Although according to 
Myers [16] the representation of the various voices 
within a group is more important than the sample size. 
Also, the sample size should be dictated by the 
saturation point of new insights, not by the number of 
interviews. Our view, however, is that the saturation 
point in this paper has not been reached and that the 
geographical spread, the interviews were held within 
one real estate company, impacts the generalisability of 
the research. Although we believe the methodology can 
be extrapolated to other industries dealing with high-
value infrequently traded assets, this is not conclusive. 
Hence, more stakeholders from a wider range within the 
real estate industry could be questioned resulting in a 
more in-depth picture. In addition, the feedback gleaned 
from the focus group identified a number of exceptions 
in the industry. These exceptions can be investigated 
using  a multi-methodological approach to gather more 
data from a variety of agencies. These limitations will 
be further addressed in a PhD thesis including the 
possible integration of blockchain to deal with the 
asymmetric knowledge distribution. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The focus of this research is on counterbalancing 
information asymmetry and in particular, the 
asymmetry that exists in many high-value low-
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 frequency transactions. We focus on one type of such 
transaction, namely the purchase of residential property. 
We gather information in the context of the New 
Zealand real estate market and propose a process that 
attempts to make the tacit, unverifiable knowledge 
explicit. The presented purchaser decision process 
model with the division of tacit and explicit information 
(a) is a building block to address the information 
asymmetry in the New Zealand real estate industry and 
(b) presents an opportunity to introduce blockchain 
technology into the real estate context. By storing all 
possible explicit information and creating a history of 
everything that has happened to the asset we will 
hopefully be able to negate mistakes that can occur to a 
novice purchaser when purchasing their new home. If 
we can also use the decision process model as a learning 
tool to understand the possible questions that could be 
asked to make an informed decision when buying a 
property, we can eliminate complications further down 
the track. We believe our work can be generalised to 
other high-value infrequently traded assets. 
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